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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jermey Flores Sanchez appeals from the district court's Order Granting State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal filed July 22, 2013, of his successive petition for post 
conviction, and the Order Denying Motion to Reconsider, and Final Judgement thereon. 
(R., pp. 204-211, 212-213). Mr. Sanchez further appeals the District Court's Order 
denying his Motion for Reconsider, said Order filed August 15, 2013 (R., pp. 231-233 
Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief and by failing to reconsider its dismissal. 
B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Sanchez was convicted originally in Canyon County Case CR-02-5737 of 
conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, 
aggravated battery and aiding and abetting attempted murder. (R., p. 204). He was 
sentenced to a unified minimum term of life on each of the first four counts, in addition 
to a unified term of fifteen years fixed, with no years indeterminate, on each of the 
convictions for aggravated battery and aiding and abetting attempted murder. (R. p. 
204). The district court ordered that all sentences were to run consecutively. (R., p. 
204). Mr. Sanchez appealed, but his case was affirmed, including the length of his 
sentence. (R., p. 204). Mr. Sanchez filed a first petition for post-conviction relief in 
2006. (R., p. 204). That petition was denied, and its denial was affirmed on appeal. 
(R., p. 204). 
On March 14, 2013, the petitioner, Mr. Sanchez, filed the instant Petition and 
Affidavit for Successive Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp. 4-7). The Petition was verified 
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(R., p. 7). The Petition was also supported by an Affidavit Of Facts filed March 14, 
2013. (R., pp. 23-24). In addition, the affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, counsel on Mr. 
Sanchez's first appeal, was filed in support of Mr. Sanchez's petition on April 5, 2013. 
(R., pp. 21-32, 150-154). 
In his petition, Mr. Sanchez claimed the following: 
a} General Claims: 
a. Newly discovered evidence, including an affidavit from Kenneth 
Wurdemann in which Mr. Wurdemann testified that he perjured himself 
during Mr. Sanchez's trial. 
b. Misconduct and/or witness tampering on the part of the prosecutor by 
using Mr. Wurdemann's perjured testimony. 
c. The State used evidence it knew was false or misleading when it procured 
Mr. Wurdemann's testimony. 
d. The State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.CT. 1194 (1963), 
by using said testimony. 
b). Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not raise 
the following issues on appeal. 
a. The trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to impose a 30 
year consecutive sentence; 
b. The fixed life term was unlawfully imposed and the trial court was 
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without subject matter to impose such sentences; 
c. the substantive crimes merge, and therefore, the consecutive 
sentences for those crimes violate the Double Jeopardy clause of the US 
Constitution; 
d. First post-conviction counsel was ineffective and said ineffective 
assistance of counsel was never addressed because the State Appellate 
Public Defender would not render ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
direct appeal, and because of the appellate representation, Mr. Sanchez 
could not file his own documents as prose, thus denying counsel in his 
direct appellate review; and, 
e. First post-conviction counsel failed to file an appeal. 
(R., pp. 4-7). 
On May 30, 2013, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal, alleging that 
the successive petition was untimely and therefore time barred, and that it did not raise 
a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp. 177-202). The district court granted the state's 
motion via its Order filed July 22, 2013. (R., pp. 204-211 ). Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to 
reconsider on August 5, 2013 (R., 218-226). The district court denied Mr. Sanchez's 
motion via order filed August 15, 2013. (R., pp. 231-232). Mr. Sanchez timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 227-228, 234-235). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
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A. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Sanchez's 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and denied Mr. 
Sanchez's Motion to Reconsder? 
B. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Sanchez's Motion to 
Reconsder? 
A. 
Ill.ARGUMENT 
A. 
The District Court Erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Sanchez's 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a 
successive petition, and denied Mr. Sanchez's Motion to Reconsder. 
A petition for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure 
Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 
798, 802 (2007). Under Idaho Code§ 19-4903, the petitioner must prove the claims 
upon which the petition is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Workman, 144 
Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
A claim for post-conviction relief must be raised in an original application. I.C. § 
19-4908. That application must be filed within one year from the expiration of the time 
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a 
proceeding following an appeal, whichever proceeding is later. I.C. § 19-4902. 
Successive petitions are impermissible "unless the court finds a ground for relief 
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. 
Section 19-4908 sets forth no fixed time within which successive petitions may be 
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filed, however, the "sufficient reason" language in the statute necessarily provides "a 
reasonable time within which such claims [may be] asserted in a successive post-
conviction petition, once those claims are known." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 
905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). The determination of what is a reasonable time is 
considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented 
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State, 
142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, a petitioner asserting 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient reason" for 
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a 
two-level burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in 
the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was 
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought. See Workman, 144 Idaho at 
522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
Summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when the applicant's 
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual 
issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 
517,518,960 P.2d 738,739 (1998); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 
241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 
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(Ct. App. 1991). 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleading, deposition, and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
1. Mr. Sanchez's contends his Petition should have been allowed under I.C. 19-
4901 and I.C. 19-408 and not been summarily dismissed due to the existence of a 
genuine issue of fact. 
Mr. Sanchez's contends that the district court erred by failing to allow his petition 
under I.C. § 19-4901 and 19-4908, and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 
P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Mr. Sanchez argues that he has made a substantial factual 
showing that his claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability the court 
process given the affidavits submitted in support of his petition, and the verified 
statements within his petition. Further, mindful of the fact that an earlier affidavit from 
Mr. Wurdemann existed concerning perjury, Mr. Sanchez contends that the differences 
between the two petitions, along with the issues involved including subject matter 
jurisdiction. work to allow a timely successive petition under I.C. § 19-4901 and 19-
4908. 
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action ... provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were 
inadequately presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction 
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relief." Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P .3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Mr. Sanchez contends that he raised substantial facts in his verified petition, the 
affidiavit of Mr. Wurdemann executed in 2011, and the affidavit of his former appellate 
counsel, Dennis Benjmin, concerning newly discovered evidence regarding perjured 
testimony at this trial, and the fact that his other underlying claims were not adequately 
presented previously, nor was his original appeal effective. 
As a result, his claims were either due to new evidence, or were not adequately 
presented as discussed in Charboneau and Baker. 
Further, Mr. Sanchez contends that he did not have access to legal resources 
nor assistance of counsel as he could not reach his attorney and did not receive 
communication from his attorney, and that for that additional reason, his arguments 
were not presented adequately previously. (R., p. 9-10). 
Mr. Sanchez presented his affidavit of facts supporting his petition setting forth 
the facts regarding the newly disovered evidence in the form of the 2011 Affidavit of Mr. 
Wurdemann, which Mr. Sanchez received in February of 2013. (R., p. 23). Further, Mr. 
Dennis Benjami~ provided an affidavit that in part notes the claims regarding perjured 
testimony and prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised in the prior post-
conviction because of the newly discovered evidence in the form of the Wurdemann 
affidavit that was not possessed or fully known at that time. (R., pp. 151-152). 
Moreover, the affidavit of Gerald Wolff disputes the facts as alleged in the Wurdemann 
affidavit, creating a materially disputed fact. ((R., pp. 117-119). 
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As stated above, summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when 
the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved 
in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131 
Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (Ct. App. 1991). 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Mr. Sanchez contends that he raised substantial facts in his pleadings as 
detailed above, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claims. It is further 
Mr. Sanchez's contention that because he raised such claims, and supported them with 
the facts in his pleadings, that summary dismissal, and the failure to reconsider or alter 
said dismissal upon his motion, was error. 
2. Mr. Sanchez contends that the district court erred by dismissing _hi~ 
claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and subject matter jurisdiction as 
untimely. 
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Mr. Sanchez contends that the district court erred when it dismissed his 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel and subject matter jurisdiction claims as 
time barred. 
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal 
See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223. 227, 91 P.3d 1127. 1131 (2004). Further, lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction ca be raised in a Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an 
illegal sentence that can be raised at any time. See, State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 
252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). Mr. Sanchez also argues that the double jeopardy 
violation alleged could have been raised under the fundamental error in existence at 
the time of the direct appeal. In 2005, "fundamental error" included such error as would 
go to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or would go to the foundation of the 
case or takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense which no court ought to 
permit him to waive. State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918-19, 854 P.2d 259 (1993), 
abrogated by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 2454 P.3d 961 (2010). 
In addition, the Brady violations alleged and prosecutorial misconduct claim were 
not properly presented previously and therefore should be allowed in a successive 
petition. An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented 
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State, 
142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005); See Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S. 
_, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316-18 (2012). 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. SANCHEZ'S 
MOTION TO RECONSDER. 
Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction claims, because he did not have effective access to 
counsel and because he filed his petition within a timely period after receiving the new 
affidavit, an affidavit that contained different facts from the original 2009 affidavit. The 
remaining arguments in favor of his contentions regarding the district court's erroneous 
failure to grant his motion to reconsider are set forth above and need not be repeated 
here. They are instead incorporated herein by this reference. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and denying his 
motion to reconsider, and remand the matter for further hearings. 
DATED this b~day of May, 2014. 
ST PHEN D. THOMPSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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